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SIX FLAGS MAGIC MOUNTAIN: A FAMILY
ENTERTAINMENT PARK, BUT ONLY IF YOU
WEAR THE RIGHT CLOTHES
Shelan Y Joseph*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1985, six people were stabbed and twenty-one were arrested at the
Six Flags Magic Mountain ("Magic Mountain") amusement park in
Valencia, California.' The violence resulted from the gang-related activity
of three San Fernando Valley gangs. In an effort to prevent future
violence in the park, Magic Mountain joined forces with the Los Angeles
County Sheriff's Department to spot typical gang members.'
The Sheriff's Department provided Magic Mountain with a "gang
member profile," identifying those types of behavior or dress generally
linked to gangs.4 The Sheriff's Department currently uses the profiles in
its own efforts to crack down on gang activity in Los Angeles County.5
Magic Mountain uses this set of police guidelines as a basis for its own
screening policy, which was designed "to spot typical gang members."6
Magic Mountain has not stated what criteria are included in its screening
policy because announcing the policy would decrease security measures.7
However, since 1985, this screening policy has generated several claims of
racial discrimination against Magic Mountain.
* J.D., Loyola Law School, 1995; B.A., University of California at Los Angeles, 1992. This
Article is dedicated to the memory of Kimberley M. Horton. The author would like to thank
those without whose love and support this Article would not have been possible: Professor Gary
Williams, Mommy, Ron, and Sabra. Special gratitude to Carol Sobel of the American Civil
Liberties Union for providing the author with all research documents relevant to Magic Mountain.
1. Steve Padilla, ACLU, 4 Latinos Allege Bias, Sue Magic Mountain, L.A. TIMES (Valley
Ed.), Apr. 19, 1988, at F8.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Kim Kowsky, Magic Mountain Sued Over Use of 'Gang Profile,' L.A. HERALD
EXAMINER, Apr. 19, 1988, at A13.
5. Padilla, supra note I.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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Magic Mountain's screening policy primarily affects young African
Americans and Latinos, as those groups are considered greater "gang risks."
When some members of these groups attempt to enter the park while
wearing the "gang clothing" described in the profiles, they have been
excluded while their Caucasian counterparts have not.8
This Article examines the park policy, which appears to be facially
neutral, to determine if it has an unconstitutional or unlawful discriminatory
impact. This Article discusses whether: (1) state action can be attributed
to Magic Mountain as a private party; (2) the park's policy violates
Constitutional rights; and (3) the policy violates the California Unruh Civil
Rights Act.
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Since 1985, four cases have been brought against Magic Mountain by
young African Americans and Latinos because of the policy for screening
for possible gang members. The plaintiffs claimed that the policy, which
is used to deter violence, is not applied uniformly to its guests. In
particular, the plaintiffs claim that Magic Mountain has a policy of:
refusing admission to their business establishment to anyone
purportedly suspected of being a gang member, and that these
suspicions are based solely upon improper racial and ethnic
stereotyping, and upon the clothing, physical appearance, race
and/or national origin of individuals seeking entrance to the
business establishment and that this policy is not based on any
reasonable criteria, including unlawful conduct or acts otherwise
inconsistent with the proper use and enjoyment of an amusement
park.9
The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") describes as
unreasonable the denial of admission to the park based on suspicion of
gang membership.'0 "[T]he use of so-called 'gang-identifier' profiles only
exacerbates these [class and racial] divisions, adding a layer of stereotyping
based on dress and presumed associations. It stigmatizes blacks because
they look like blacks, Latinos because they look like Latinos.""
8. See infra notes 10, 12, 19.
9. First Amended Complaint at 5, Hernandez v. Six Flags Magic Mountain, Inc., (filed in
Cal. Super. Ct., Apr. 18, 1988) (No. 683354) [hereinafter Hernandez Complaint].
10. Carol Sobel, Screening the Crowds at Magic Mountain, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 1988, at
1i. Id. at F5.
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Preventing gang violence in an amusement park is a valid purpose for
a screening policy. But Magic Mountain's policies are based on
stereotypes that target African Americans and Latinos. Magic Mountain,
by applying its policy without uniformity, violates the Constitutional rights
of young Latinos and African Americans seeking access to the park.
III. BACKGROUND
A. Settled Cases
All of the foregoing cases have been settled subject to a non-
admission clause. As the settlements are under seal, it is not known
whether Magic Mountain admitted to any of the complaint's allegations.
Since the complaints raise the basic arguments which are the foundation of
this Article, they will be cited to as fact.
In Hernandez v. Six Flags Magic Mountain," Magic Mountain
refused entry to four Latino youths. After seeing the plaintiffs in their van,
a Magic Mountain employee said, "Oh look, a bunch of Mexicans in [a]
van ... [s]end them over here."' 13 Plaintiffs were then "directed to drive
behind a wall and were ordered to get out of the vehicle."' 4  Magic
Mountain's security guards searched the plaintiffs without their consent,
then interrogated them. 5 The guards subsequently denied the plaintiffs
entry to the park and escorted them from the park. Deputies of the Los
Angeles County Sheriff's Department then followed the plaintiffs to the
nearest freeway on-ramp.'
6
The Hernandez plaintiffs claim that they were ejected from the facility
because their physical characteristics "allegedly coincided with an
overbroad and overinclusive physical description which [Magic Mountain]
consider[s] as evidence of active gang membership."'' 7 Magic Mountain
used "policies and practices relying impermissibly upon racial and ethnic
stereotypes unrelated to the conduct or likely conduct of [p]laintiffs."'"
12. Hernandez Complaint, supra note 9.
13. Id. at 6.
14. Id. at 5.
15. Id. at 6-7.
16. Id. at 8.
17. Hernandez Complaint, supra note 9, at 2.
18. Id. at 8.
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In Gongura v. Six Flags Magic Mountain, Inc.,' a group of
seventeen people, including the Latino plaintiffs, went to Magic Mountain
in three cars.20 The group included the plaintiffs' friends and children.2
Upon entering the park, one of the cars was motioned out of line by a Los
Angeles County Deputy Sheriff. Plaintiff Joe Hernandez told a Magic
Mountain Security Guard that "two of his children and several of his
grandchildren had been pulled out of line. 2 3  The Magic Mountain
security guard responded that the children would not be allowed into the
park unless they submitted to a search.24 Pursuant to the search, the
children were ejected from the park because they were suspected of
participating in gang activity.25 "Plaintiffs also observed a number of
individuals, predominantly black and Latino, being searched.
26
On July 16, 1988, plaintiff Anthony Perry, who is Latino, went to
Magic Mountain with his mother, stepfather, two sisters, and girlfriend. 7
At the park's entrance gate, a Magic Mountain security guard approached
Perry and told him that he "fit the profile of a suspected gang member.
28
Security informed Perry that he would be denied entrance into the park,
unless he submitted to a search. Perry was searched. He complained
about being singled out for a search. Based upon his complaint, the guard
denied him admission to the park.30
B. Pending Case Against Magic Mountain
One case currently awaiting resolution in the Los Angeles Superior
Court is Alarcon v. Six Flags Magic Mountain.3 On May 23, 1993, the
Latino plaintiffs arrived together at Magic Mountain for an outing. Magic
Mountain security guards approached them and ordered them "to a small
19. First Amended Complaint, Gongura v. Six Flags Magic Mountain, Inc., (filed in Cal.
Super. Ct., Aug. 24, 1988) (No. C691327) [hereinafter Gongura Complaint].
20. Id. at 4.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Gongura Complaint, supra note 19, at 4.
25. Id. at 6.
26. Id. at 4.
27. Id. at 5.
28. Id.
29. Gongura Complaint, supra note 19, at 5.
30. Id. at 6.
31. Verified Complaint, Alarcon v. Six Flags Magic Mountain, Inc., (filed in Cal. Super. Ct.,
June 3, 1993) (No. 90-345) [hereinafter Alarcon Complaint].
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room upon exiting the tram."32  Plaintiffs were interrogated and then
"ejected from the facility, and humiliated solely because their physical
characteristics allegedly coincided with ... [a] physical description or
profile," which Magic Mountain considered evidence of active gang
membership.33 Plaintiffs were accused falsely of being gang members
because Magic Mountain's profile "relies primarily on one's race, and/or
national origin and upon other improper ethnic, cultural, and physical
traits. 34 Plaintiffs were ejected from the park despite the fact that they
were "acting lawfully and in a manner consistent with proper standards of
behavior."35 In addition, plaintiffs were told that they could "never return
to the amusement park, and that if they dared to do so they would be
arrested for trespass immediately.,
36
C. Discriminatory Searches Where No Case Was Filed
"Nine black members of a Christian youth organization [from San
Diego] on an outing to Six Flags Magic Mountain were singled out by
guards from a crowd of predominantly white teen-agers [sic] and searched
for weapons and drugs before being admitted to the amusement park.
37
After the search, the youth were admitted into the park.38
In another incident, "six boys out of forty youths from a South
Central Los Angeles group were stopped as they got off their bus and
started to enter the park. 39 When asked by one of the adults why the
boys could not enter the park, "park guards responded that they just did not
like their looks. 40  There was "no search, [n]o unruly behavior, [n]o
reason at all" to justify denying the boys entry to the park.4 The six
were, however, wearing their community baseball league's caps.42
Each of these cases carries a common element: Magic Mountain's
screening policy, as applied, discriminates against African American and
Latino youths. Although many youths, regardless of race, wear the "gang"
32. Id. at 5.
33. Id. at 1.
34. Id. at 2.
35. Id.
36. Alarcon Complaint, supra note 3 1, at 2.
37. Stephanie Chavez, Search of Black Christian Youths at Park Decried, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
18, 1988, at 113.
38. Id.
39. Carol Sobel, Point/Counterpoint, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 1988, at DIO.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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clothing, there are no known cases of this type of discrimination against
Caucasians. 3 Youths of all races wear the "gang" style clothing because
the teen fashion world has embraced the "gang wear" trend.4 Since gang
clothing has become popular, the clothing by itself cannot adequately
identify gang members. The increase in the popularity of gang clothing,
coupled with an increased number of African American and Latino youths
who wear this type of clothing creates an arena for discriminatory
application of Magic Mountain's policy.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
A. Finding State Action As a Private Party
Prior to invoking the protections of the United States Constitution as
opposed to statutory remedies, plaintiffs must show state involvement in the
action which allegedly violated their rights. Since the Constitution
primarily governs states and not individuals, it can be violated only by
conduct that may be fairly characterized as state action.45  The
Constitution's wording clearly warrants this application: the Fourteenth
Amendment states that "[n]o [s]tate shall make or enforce any law,"'46 and
the First Amendment mandates that "Congress shall make no law., 47 As
such, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant is a state actor before any
claims of Constitutional rights violations may proceed.
There has been a transition over the years in the Supreme Court's
analysis as to when state action may be attached to private parties.4 8 The
Supreme Court has significantly curtailed its finding of state action where
private parties are concerned.49  This increasingly restrictive application
of the state action doctrine makes it difficult for plaintiffs to assert
constitutional violations against private parties.5 Further, the retreat from
classifying private parties as state actors leaves no clear standard of
analysis.5 ' Theories surrounding state action and private parties remain
largely incoherent.
43. See parts II, III.
44. See infra text accompanying note 229.
45. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
48. See infra notes 53-83 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 54, 62. Cf note 15.
50. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
51. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
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The first case that attempted to create a test for finding state action
when a private party was involved was Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority. 2 Burton's decision was important for two reasons. First, the
Supreme Court rejected a uniform standard for defining state action; rather,
it recognized that "to fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition
of state responsibility ... is an 'impossible task' . . . . Only by sifting
facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the
State in private conduct be attributed its true significance." 3  Second,
Burton has come to be identified with a state action rationale, the
"symbiotic relationship" theory. State action arises when the affairs of a
public and a private actor are interrelated in such a manner that each
benefits from the relationship.54
Applying this analysis, the Burton Court attributed state action to the
private party involved. The Supreme Court held that a privately owned
restaurant which leased premises in a government-owned and government-
maintained parking garage was a state actor subject to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Burton, the defendant owned a
restaurant that was located in a parking building owned by the government.
The defendant refused to serve the plaintiff solely because he was African
American. 5 The building in which the restaurant was located was built
with public funds for public purposes, and it was owned and operated by
an agency of the state of Delaware.56 Applying the "symbiotic relation-
ship" test, the Court held that the state was considered a joint participant
in the operation of the restaurant.57 The restaurant was physically and
financially an integral part of the public building. 8 The court held that
this intertwined relationship was sufficient to treat the privately-owned
restaurant as a state actor.59
The Supreme Court's apparent retreat from equating private parties to
state actors began in 1974 with its decision in Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Company.60 In Jackson, the plaintiff sued a privately owned and
operated utility corporation. The utility corporation held a certificate of
public convenience, in the form of a general tariff, issued by the Pennsyl-
52. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
53. Id. at 722.
54. See generally id. at 722-25.
55. Burton, 365 U.S. at 716.
56. Id. at 718-19.
57. Id. at 724.
58. Id. at 723-24.
59. Id.
60. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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vania Utilities Commission. The defendant allegedly terminated plaintiff's
electrical utility service before giving plaintiff notice, a hearing, and an
opportunity to be heard.6' Plaintiff claimed that under state law she was
entitled to continuous electric service and that the general tariff provision
which permitted the defendant to terminate service for nonpayment
constituted state action.62
The Court held that the relevant inquiry in determining whether the
private entity is a state actor must be "whether there is a sufficiently close
nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity
so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the [s]tate
itself. '63 In describing its "nexus test," the Court stated:
The purpose of this [nexus] requirement is to assure that
constitutional standards are invoked only when it can be said
that the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the
plaintiff complains .... [A] State normally can be held
responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised
coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement,
either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to
be that of the State .... Mere approval ... or acquiescence...
is not sufficient [for state action].'
In applying the nexus test, the Court rejected the plaintiff's claim that
state action arose simply because the commission extensively regulated the
private utility.65  The Court determined that the State Public Utilities
Commission's approval of the general tariff failed to establish the requisite
nexus because the Commission had not explicitly considered the ter-
mination portion of the tariff.
66
Four years after Jackson was decided, the Supreme Court narrowed
its state action analysis in Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks.67 In Flagg
Brothers, the Supreme Court rejected a due process challenge to a
warehouse's sale of the plaintiff's stored personal property. The New York
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") governed the defendant's act in selling
plaintiff's goods. The UCC provision allowed the warehouse to sell goods
entrusted for storage in order to satisfy unpaid storage expenses.68 The
61. Id. at 348 n.2.
62. Id. at 348.
63. Id. at 351.
64. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982).
65. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358.
66. Id. at 351.
67. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
68. Id.
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Court concluded that the appropriate test assesses whether the private
party's action may "[fairly be] attributed to the [s]tate. 69 In determining
whether a state is responsible for the acts of a private party the court must
examine whether a "[s]tate, by its law, has compelled the act."7  The
Court held that the State "merely announced the circumstances under which
its courts will not interfere with a private sale."'" Therefore, the state was
"in no way responsible for Flagg Brothers' decision [to sell the goods], a
decision which the state [via the statute] permits but does not compel."72
Thus, when the warehouse sold plaintiff's goods, the state had not
compelled the warehouse to do so. As such, the warehouse action could
not be fairly attributed to the state.
Flagg Bros. remained the standard of analysis until 1982, when the
Supreme Court decided Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co. 73 The Lugar Court
further restricted state action analysis by incorporating both the Jackson
"nexus" theory and the "fairly attributable" analysis of Flagg Bros. into one
test, 74 making it almost impossible for state action to be attributed to a
private party. The Supreme Court now mandates a two-prong test to
determine whether the action by a private party fairly can be attributed to
the state. The Lugar test is stated as:
a) The deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right
or privilege created by the state or by a rule of conduct imposed
by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible;
and
b) the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who
may fairly be said to be a state actor, either because he [or she]
is an official of the state, because he [or she] has acted together
with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or
because his [or her] conduct is otherwise chargeable to the
State.75
In Lugar, the plaintiff owed a debt to defendant Edmondson Oil. The
defendant sued to collect the debt in Virginia state court.76 Acting on a
petition, "a [c]lerk of the state court issued a writ of attachment, which was
69. Id. at 164.
70. Id. (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970)).
71. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 166.
72. Id.
73. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
74. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937-39.
75. Id. at 937.
76. Id. at 924.
1996]
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then executed by the [c]ounty [s]heriff."" In Lugar, the link between the
state and the private party was sufficient to find state action.78
By applying its new test, the Supreme Court found that a "private
party's joint participation with state officials in the seizure of disputed
property is sufficient to characterize that party as a 'state actor' for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment., 79  Prong one was satisfied
because Edmondson had acted pursuant to a procedural scheme which was
the product of state action.80 Prong two was satisfied because Edmondson
enlisted the help of the county sheriff to execute the writ.
81
The Supreme Court currently uses the two-prong test enunciated in
Lugar, but it remains unclear how the test will be applied. The two-prong
test allows the court discretion in whether or not to find state action. The
discretion is evinced in the varying applications of the test. As a result,
when a plaintiff attempted to demonstrate that a private party should be
deemed a state actor under Lugar, the plaintiff's only certainty is that
Lugar analysis makes the process difficult.
The circuit courts are less stringent in their state actor analysis, and
attribute state action to private parties with a more lenient hand. 2 For
example, the Ninth Circuit's inquiry to find state action focuses on a "joint
action" theory. 3 Joint action arises when "the state has 'so far insinuated
itself into a position of interdependence with the [private entity] that it must
be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity....
"Joint action therefore requires a substantial degree of cooperative action"
between the state and the private party.8 5 This requires more than merely
complaining to the police.
Applying the "Joint action" theory, the.Ninth Circuit has attributed
state action to private parties more frequently than the Supreme Court. In
Stypman v. City & County of San Francisco,6 the Ninth Circuit ruled that
a private towing company was a state actor. The Court reasoned that a
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 924.
82. See infra notes 88, 97, 102 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 88, 94, 102 and accompanying text.
84. Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Gorenc v. Salt
River Project, 869 F.2d 503, 507 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.,
365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961))).
85. Id.
86. 557 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1977).
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towing company is a "willful participant in a joint activity with the State
or its agents" where:
A police officer makes the initial determination that a car will
be towed and summons the towing company. The towing
company tows the vehicle only at the direction of the officer.
The officer designates the garage to which the vehicle will be
towed.... The towing company detains the vehicle and asserts
the lien. 7
In Howerton v. Gabica,8 the court determined that repeated police
assistance to a private party constituted state action. The defendant
landlord repeatedly used police to assist in evicting tenants. In Howerton,
tenants brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action based on the landlord's alleged
unlawful eviction. The landlord had asked the plaintiffs to leave their
trailer house because they had not paid their rent.89 The landlord
requested a uniformed police officer to serve the eviction notice to the
landlord's tenants.9" On another occasion, a police officer accompanied
the landlord when the landlord informed the plaintiffs that their water and
power services would be terminated.9' Upon the landlord's request, an
officer went to the plaintiffs' residence to ask them to leave the
premises.92 Additionally, an officer accompanied the landlord when the
landlord disconnected the plaintiffs' power services.93
The Howerton court stated that this case "involve[d] more than a
single incident of police consent to 'stand by' in case of trouble .... The
police officer 'actively intervened-[when] he privately approached the
Howertons and recommended that they leave the trailer house." '94 The
court further stated that "the actions of the [officer] created an appearance
that the police sanctioned the eviction." 95 In conclusion, the court held
that the landlord's repeated requests for police assistance and the "active
intervention" by the police were sufficient to support a finding of state
action."
87. Id.
88. 708 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1983).
89. ld. at 381.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 381.
93. Howerlon, 708 F.2d at 381.
94. Id. at 384.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 385.
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Similarly, in Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. Pacific
Telephone and Telegraph Co., 97 the court found state action when the
telephone company "repeatedly requested" law enforcement agents to act
on behalf of the company. Sable, a phone sex company, brought a section
1983 action against Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company. Sable
challenged the enforcement of a rule, implemented by the California Public
Utilities Commission, which authorized the disconnection of telephone
services that propagated sexually explicit messages.98 Sable claimed that
Pacific Telegraph acted under color of state law in seeking to implement
the rule.99
The Ninth Circuit agreed. The court decided that for the purposes of
section 1983, the telephone company acted under the color of state law by
seeking to implement state regulatory procedures which required the
company to withhold telephone service to sexually explicit message
services.'00 The telephone company's repeated requests for law enforce-
ment agents triggered procedures that violated customers' First Amendment
rights. This satisfied the requirement of joint participation between state
and private parties, which is necessary to find state action.'0'
In contrast, Collins v. Womancare02 demonstrated failure to show
sufficient joint participation between the state and a private party to justify
a finding of state action. Employees of a women's health service facility
placed the plaintiffs, who were anti-abortion picketers, under citizen's
arrest. Plaintiffs sued under section 1983, charging that their civil rights
were violated by this action.
0 3
In determining whether or not there was state action, the Ninth Circuit
focused its analysis on the "joint action" theory.' 4 In using the "joint
action" standard, the court held that "the facts alleged by Collins as a group
fail as a matter of law to satisfy the joint activity test for state action."'0 5
The facts could not establish that the state had "so far insinuated itself into
a position of interdependence ... that it must be recognized as a joint
participant in the challenged activity."'0 6 Several factors led the court to
97. 890 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1989).
98. Id. at 186.
99. Id. at 187.
100. Id. at 185.
101. Id.
102. 878 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1989).
103. Id. at 1146.
104. Id. at 1154.
105. Id. at 1155.
106. Id. (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)).
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hold that there was no state action: (1) the impetus for the arrest came
from Womancare employees, and not from the police; (2) police officers
refused to arrest protesters on the officers' own authority; (3) the police
maintained a policy of neutrality in the dispute; and (4) no evidence
indicated that the police encouraged Womancare employees to make the
citizen's arrests.
The Eighth Circuit has also demonstrated leniency in attributing state
action to private parties. In El Fundi v. Deroche,'7 the court found the
evidence sufficient to result in state action. The plaintiffs were shopping
in a Target Department store, 08 where they were detained by store
security guards. Store employees physically restrained and threatened the
plaintiffs until the city police arrived.' °9 Upon their arrival, the police
issued the plaintiffs a ticket summons for shoplifting."0 The court ruled
that state action existed "when private security guards act in concert with
police officers or pursuant to customary procedures agreed to by police
departments.""' The security guards acted in accordance with these
customary procedures: this "converted" the security guards into state
actors.' 12
In the Magic Mountain disputes, a problem arises for plaintiffs in
satisfying the two-prong test for equal protection claims: caselaw
demonstrates that a federal constitutional claim requires plaintiffs to prove
both that the park was a state actor when it screened for gang members,
and that the park acted pursuant to a state-created right or privilege when
executing its screening policy. These requirements pose difficulties for
plaintiffs.
Relying on Lugar, Magic Mountain can argue that there was no state
action. Under prong one, Magic Mountain did not act pursuant to a state
rule of conduct or a state-created privilege. Instead, the park acted
pursuant to its own security policy. Although the Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department assisted in creating the policy,"3 the policy is not
a state-created measure. At its own initiative, Magic Mountain created,
adopted, and implemented the screening policy. Therefore, Magic
Mountain's screening cannot be deemed "state action."
107. 625 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1980).
108. Id. at 196.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. ElFundi, 625 F.2d at 196.
113. Kowsky, supra note 4.
19961
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Furthermore, under Flagg Bros., Inc v. Brooks,'14 Magic Mountain
cannot be deemed a state actor. In Flagg Bros., a private company acted
pursuant to a state statute. As the state did not compel the acts of the
private company, the action could not be attributed to the state. Similar to
Flagg Bros., the County Sheriff assisted Magic Mountain in forming its
screening policy, but the park was not compelled by any state directive to
adopt the policy." 5 The state was not responsible for the park's decision
to implement the security policy. Therefore, Magic Mountain cannot fairly
be said to be acting as the state.
Under prong two, Magic Mountain cannot be found to be a state
actor. Magic Mountain, by favorable analogy to Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co.," 6 could argue that even when private corporations are
heavily regulated by the state, the corporations are not considered state
actors simply by virtue of the regulation. Therefore, the park's implemen-
tation of its own screening program is not one that is dictated by the state,
and Magic Mountain cannot be found to be a state actor.
Since the two prongs of Lugar cannot be satisfied in a federal claim,
Magic Mountain cannot be said to be a state actor. There is insufficient
evidence to support a finding of state action. The use of the security policy
cannot be said to be a policy of the state, and as such, a state action
argument would likely fail.
On the other hand, plaintiffs could argue that there is sufficient
evidence to sustain a claim for state action against Magic Mountain. First,
under Lugar, plaintiffs can argue that the security policy is a state rule of
conduct because it is a state security policy used by a state official. Use
of the screening policy is state conduct because the policy was designed
and executed by the Sheriff's Department-a subdivision of the state.1
7
The president of Magic Mountain, Joseph R. Schillaci, stated that Magic
Mountain uses "a screening profile developed in conjunction with the Los
Angeles County Sheriff's department and their Operation Safe Streets gang
unit.""' 8 Magic Mountain's incorporation of a state rule of conduct could
satisfy prong one.
Under prong two, plaintiffs would rely on the facts set forth in Lugar.
In Lugar, the court found a sufficient nexus between the private party and
114. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
115. Chavez, supra note 37.
116. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
117. Interview with David Burcham, Associate Professor of Law at Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles, Cal. (Nov. 7, 1993).
118. Joseph R. Schillaci, Screening the Crowds at Magic Mountain, L.A. TIMES (Valley Ed.),
May 28, 1988, at D5.
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the state based on the private party's use of the Sheriff to execute a writ.
Magic Mountain enlisted the Sheriff's Department to aid the park in
executing the security policy. Magic Mountain's President stated that the
park occasionally "use[s] Los Angeles County sheriff's deputies to identify
gang members who intend to use the park for other than recreation." 9
Further, in an interview with the Herald Examiner, a Magic Mountain
spokesperson, Sherrie Bang, stated that Magic Mountain has received
advice from the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department on the proper
way to use the profile. 20 Another spokeswoman for Magic Mountain,
Courtney Brown, stated that "Magic Mountain security officials work with
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department officials to determine what types
of gang insignia to look for and routinely search people whose clothes
indicate gang membership."''
This relationship between the Sheriff's Department and Magic
Mountain suggests a significant link which implies state action. This link
could be used to impute state action to Magic Mountain and can satisfy
both prongs of the Lugar analysis. Prong one is satisfied since Magic
Mountain is acting pursuant to state rules of conduct. Prong two is
satisfied through the apparent link between Magic Mountain and the state.
Therefore, under Lugar, the park's action should be attributed to the state.
Since the application of Lugar remains unclear, plaintiffs will look to
the circuit courts to support their state action arguments. Relying on
Howerton and Sable, plaintiffs can argue that Magic Mountain is a state
actor because the park "repeatedly enlists" the aid of sheriffs. Additionally,
the Sheriff's Department "actively intervenes" in executing the park's
security policy.
Plaintiff's strongest argument for finding state action is under a
Collins analysis. First, the impetus for seizing potential park visitors arises
from profits generated by the Sheriff's Department, not Magic Mountain.
The park implements the Sheriff's Department policy.'22 Second, sheriffs
seize and detain plaintiffs pursuant to the sheriffs' own authority. The
sheriffs go to Magic Mountain and execute the security policy. 23 Third,
the Sheriff's Department has not maintained a neutral stance in the park's
decision to bar visitors; the sheriff's direct involvement disallows such an
119. Id.
120. Kowsky, supra note 4.
121. Chavez, supra note 37.
122. See Kowsky, supra note 4; Chavez, supra note 37.
123. See Kowsky, supra note 4; Chavez, supra note 37.
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assertion.124  Finally, evidence indicates that the Sheriff's Department
encouraged Magic Mountain to use this policy.'25
The foregoing analysis indicates that plaintiffs have sufficient
evidence for a strong argument that the park policy constitutes state action.
The Sheriff's Department's direct involvement and encouragement provides
a strong nexus between the state and Magic Mountain. The sheriffs'
enforcement of the park's security policy creates an appearance that the
state is directly involved with the implementation and success of the policy.
Magic Mountain is acting together with and obtaining significant aid from
the Sheriff's Department. Therefore, the park's actions can be seen as
"fairly attributable" to the state, and state action should be imputed.
B. Violation of Equal Protection Under
the Fourteenth Amendment
The Constitution declares that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any
law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." 26 This has been interpreted to mean -that "[t]he
central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis
of race."' 27 Under an equal protection analysis, race-based classifications
are "suspect" and receive "strict scrutiny" analysis. To pass the strict
scrutiny test, the state actor has the burden of proving that: 1) there is a
compelling government interest for the state action; and 2) the state action
is narrowly tailored to meet the state interest.
28
Plaintiffs must allege that they are being discriminated against on the
basis of race. Under an equal protection analysis, race is considered a
suspect class for regulation. 29 If a statute or law is neutral on its face,
plaintiffs must make a prima facie case of racial discrimination before the
strict scrutiny analysis will be triggered. The prima facie case requires
showing either that the actor had the purpose or intent to discriminate, or
that the action had an extremely disproportionate impact on minorities. 30
124. Chavez, supra note 37.
125. See Kowsky, supra note 4; Chavez, supra note 37.
126. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
127. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
128. Hernandez Complaint, supra note 9; see infra notes 170, 174 and accompanying text.
129. WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 710-11 (9th ed.
1993).
130. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977).
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1. Intent
Showing a violation of the Equal Protection clause has become
increasingly difficult for plaintiffs. This is so because absent an express
discriminatory purpose, intent is not easily proven. 31  Additionally,
unless there is an intent to discriminate, disproportionate impact is
irrelevant. "[C]ases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other
official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory
purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate
impact."
'132
In Washington v. Davis, the court held that "[a] statute otherwise
neutral on its face, must not be applied so as invidiously to discriminate on
the basis of race." 133 However, the court continued:
Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be
inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact,
if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than
another. It is also not infrequently true that the discriminatory
impact ... may for all practical purposes demonstrate un-
constitutionality because in various circumstances the
discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds.
Nevertheless, we have not held that a law, neutral on its face
and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to
pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply
because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of
another. Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not
the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination
forbidden by the Constitution.'34
2. Disproportionate Impact
In rare cases, the Supreme Court has found violations of the Equal
Protection clause when there was an egregiously disproportionate racial
impact. ' Disproportionate impact must be evidenced by a "stark"
pattern to be accepted as the sole proof of discriminatory intent under the
Constitution. 36 Earlier cases indicated that the Supreme Court acknowl-
131. See generally McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
132. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
133. Id. at 241 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
134. Id. at 242.
135. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
136. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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edged racial impact as sufficient to prove violations of the Equal Protection
Clause. 3 7 However, recent cases have shown otherwise.
The issue in Wright v. Council of Emporia138 involved whether the
division of a school district was consistent with an outstanding order of a
federal court to desegregate the area's dual school system. The court
determined that in cases concerning racial impact, a law's effect, rather than
its discriminatory purpose, is the critical factor.139 The continued division
along racial lines in the Emporia school district constituted a violation of
the Equal Protection clause because Emporia enforced racial
segregation.
40
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,"4' an ordinance prohibited the operation of
laundries without a permit from the government. When laundry operators
applied for permits, all but one of the Caucasian applicants received
permits. None of more than two hundred Chinese applicants received their
permits. The court held that:
[t]hough the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, if it is applied and administered by public authority
with an evil eye and unequal hand so as practically to make
unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice
is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.'42
Similarly, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 43 the court held that despite the
facially neutral terms in the state's zoning laws, evidence of a dispropor-
tionate impact was enough to prove a violation of the Equal Protection
clause. The state legislature altered the boundaries of a particular city in
a discriminatory fashion, "from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided
figure.""' The alterations were alleged to have excluded 395 of 400
African American voters without excluding a single Caucasian voter. 
14
The court found that this was a sufficient showing of a disproportionate
impact to find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
146
137. See infra notes 138, 141, 143 and accompanying text.
138. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
139. Id. at 462.
140. Id.
141. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
142. Id. at 373-74.
143. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
144. Id. at 340.
145. Id. at 341.
146. Id. at 348.
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In contrast, however, the court found disproportionate impact alone
insufficient to violate the Equal Protection Clause in McCleskey v.
Kemp.'4 7 Here, an African American man was convicted in a Georgia
trial court for killing a Caucasian police officer during the robbery of a
store. Pursuant to a Georgia statute, McCleskey was sentenced to death.
In arguing that his sentence was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,
McCleskey pointed to a statistical study that "purports to show a disparity
in the imposition of the death sentence in Georgia based on the murder
victim's race and, to a lesser extent the defendant's race."' 48 The study
was based on over 2000 murder cases that occurred in Georgia during the
1970s and involved data relating to the victim's race, the defendant's race,
and the various combinations of such persons' races. 49  The study
indicated that African Americans who killed Caucasians were more likely
to be sentenced to death than Caucasians who killed African Americans.
The study found that the prosecution sought death penalty sentences in
seventy percent of cases involving African American defendants and
Caucasian victims, but in only nineteen percent of cases involving
Caucasian defendants and African American victims. 5 ° The study also
found that African Americans were one hundred and ten percent more
likely to receive the death penalty than Caucasian defendants.' 5 '
Yet, this evidence of a disproportionate impact in sentencing was held
to be insufficient to find discriminatory intent. For a defendant to prevail,
he or she "would have to prove that the Georgia Legislature enacted or
maintained the death penalty statute because of an anticipated racially
discriminatory effect."' 52  There was no evidence that the "legislature
either enacted the statute to further a racially discriminatory purpose, or
maintained the statute because of the racially disproportionate impact."'
' 53
Since the intent to discriminate was not explicit, the racially discriminatory
effects were found to be insufficient to violate the Equal Protection
Clause. 5
It is difficult for plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination because purpose or intent is difficult to demonstrate. In the
Magic Mountain cases, the plaintiffs alleged that their right to equal
147. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 286.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 298.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 299.
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protection under the law was violated because the park's policy leads to
race-based discrimination. A prima facie case is difficult to prove in this
instance because Magic Mountain asserts that its purpose is to implement
a security policy.
In particular, the park's president, Joseph Schillaci, stated that the
purpose of the profile "is to keep weapons and those who pose a threat to
our guests and employees out of the park."'' 55  In addition, Six Flags
Magic Mountain is a major regional entertainment attraction which provides
quality family entertainment and recreation in Southern California. It has
a commitment and responsibility to provide safety and security for its
guests at all times.1
56
The plaintiffs' argument is that, despite the facially nondiscriminatory
purpose of the profile, its application is discriminatory. This argument is
supported by several factors. First, the suits brought against Magic
Mountain all were brought by young African American or Latino youths.
Second, the plaintiffs allege they were denied access to the park based on
a "stereotypical image of Latino [and African American] youth" that
characterizes them as potential gang members.' 57 Finally, the plaintiffs
were denied entrance into the park even though "no weapons, no drugs,
[and] no unruly behavior" were present. 58 This arguably demonstrated
a discriminatory purpose. Although the park's stated purpose was to ensure
the absence of weapons, drugs, or potential violence, plaintiffs were
excluded despite their having shown no signs that they might bring these
into the park.
However, these facts alone may fall short of showing a "stark"
disproportionate impact. 59 Plaintiffs can use Yick Wo and Gomillion to
frame arguments regarding a stark pattern of racial discrimination.
Notably, the argument under Yick Wo is unlikely to prevail because no
subsequent plaintiff has prevailed by using the "stark pattern" theory.
Plaintiffs may still raise the argument that the policy is "particularly
unjust" because it only affects African American and Latino youths. The
result of excluding these individuals from the park has been to make unjust
155. Schillaci, supra note 118.
156. Id.
157. Sobel, supra note 10.
158. Id.
159. Plaintiffs could argue that the intent requirement exemplifies how the equal protection
doctrine promotes an ideological imagery which fosters racism and prevents plaintiffs from
receiving an adequate remedy. An extensive treatment of this argument is beyond the scope of
this Article.
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and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances."6
Plaintiffs can also analogize to Gomillion by pointing to the recent
popularity of gang wear. Youths of all ethnicities currently wear gang-style
clothing, yet only African American and Latino youths are targeted by the
screening policy. Magic Mountain's policy as it is applied yields a stark
pattern of racial discrimination.' However, as it is difficult to
demonstrate a stark pattern which satisfies the Supreme Court, it is
probable the claim would fail.
3. Compelling Interest
As previously discussed, the intent requirement poses serious hurdles
for plaintiffs wishing to show an Equal Protection violation. However,
assuming that the plaintiffs can establish their prima facie case, Magic
Mountain must prove that it has a compelling interest in maintaining its
policy-and that this policy is the least discriminatory way to achieve
safety within the park.
The Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications
... be subjected to the "most rigid scrutiny," and, if they are
ever to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the
accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent
of the racial discrimination which it was the object of the
Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate.
62
Magic Mountain claims that it has a compelling interest in trying to
keep the park free from violence. And, certainly, the safety of patrons is
a compelling interest for the park: ethically, logically and economically,
or the park would cease to draw patrons at all if it were known for being
unsafe. Yet, plaintiffs have strong arguments that the park's policy is not
the least discriminatory way to achieve its purpose.
Plaintiffs can argue that if Magic Mountain is truly trying to ensure
safety, park security would search all who entered the park, rather than pick
certain people out of the crowd. Plaintiffs can also argue that Magic
Mountain could install metal detectors for all patrons to pass through since
this would be more effective in keeping weapons out of the park. And
finally, plaintiffs can argue that a dress code should be enforced against
everyone, not just those who fit a gang profile. In sum, since alternate
160. See generally Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
161. See supra parts 11, III.
162. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S.214, 216 (1944)).
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protective measures are available and can be applied uniformly to all
patrons, using the gang profile is not the least discriminatory way to
achieve a safer park.
Although Magic Mountain clearly has a compelling interest in
ensuring the safety of its guests and employees, it has not chosen the least
discriminatory way to achieve its purpose. As such, the park violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. Violations of the First Amendment
1. Freedom of Expression
Magic Mountain's gang profile restricts African American and Latino
youths from entering the park based on their dress. Denying the youths
entrance into the park raises two issues: (1) are youths entitled to the
protections of the First Amendment; and (2) is dress a protected form of
expression under the First Amendment?
a. First Amendment as Applied to Youth
Magic Mountain's gang profile primarily has been applied to African
American and Latino youths. The Supreme Court has recognized that
young people do have constitutional protections. However, in recent First
Amendment cases, these protections have eroded. 163  Tinker v. Des
Moines' 6 set forth the constitutional baseline for the First Amendment
protection provided for youths. Tinker created an implicit balancing test
for determining which rights are protected and which are not. The
Supreme Court held that an Iowa high school violated students' First
Amendment rights by prohibiting students from wearing black armbands in
protest of the Vietnam War.165  The school attempted to suppress the
demonstrations by suspending the students involved.
66
In supporting students' First Amendment rights, the Court held that
proscribing speech and expression is justified only if a school can show
that the proscribed speech or expression "materially and substantially
163. See infra notes 170, 174 and accompanying text. For plaintiffs to sustain an action
against Magic Mountain for a First Amendment violation, they must first prove state action and
then demonstrate how the park violates its guests' First Amendment rights. See discussion, part
IV.A.
164. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
165. Id. at 514.
166. Id. at 504.
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interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation
of the school;' 67 or, that the activity in question would "impinge upon
the rights of other students."' 6' The court explicitly acknowledged the
constitutional rights of youths by stating that "[i]t can hardly be argued that
.. students ... shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate."'
169
Although Tinker clearly ruled that youths have the right to invoke
First Amendment protections, recent Supreme Court cases indicate that
these protections are decreasing. In Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser,'7 ° the Court announced a new standard for determining whether
youths can invoke First Amendment protections. Bethel involved a high
school student who, during a school assembly, delivered a speech
containing a sexual metaphor. 7' As a result, the school suspended the
student for three days. 2 The Court concluded that the "determination
of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is
inappropriate properly rests with the school board.' 73 This standard gave
total deference to school administrators to define the First Amendment
protections available to their students, thereby weakening Tinker's distinct
protections.
The standard in Bethel was further supported by the Supreme Court's
decision in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. 74 Kuhlmeier was
"concern[ed with] the extent to which educators may exercise editorial
control over the contents of a high school newspaper produced as part of
the school's journalism curriculum."'175  The Court found no First
Amendment violation when the school principal deleted two pages of the
school newspaper.' 76  The Court articulated the following standard for
evaluating students' rights: "educators do not offend the First Amendment
by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech
in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.' 77 This holding
made clear that students' First Amendment protections were no longer
167. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
168. Id.
169. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
170. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 683.
174. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
175. Id. at 262.
176. Id. at 276.
177. Id. at 273.
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explicit Constitutional rights, but instead were to be determined by the
standard of a reasonable school administrator.
The park could try analogizing its position to that of the schools in
preceding cases. Magic Mountain certainly has a compelling interest in
maintaining its family environment, just as a school has a compelling
interest in maintaining its educational environment. However, Magic
Mountain's concerns clearly are distinguishable from those of the school:
the park has no "pedagogical concerns."
The Kuhlmeier court specifically identified "pedagogical concerns" as
one rationale which supported allowing schools to exercise First
Amendment control over students. Therefore, under Kuhlmeier, the park's
argument is less compelling to justify the right to control its patrons' dress.
Yet, the argument is not without merit. The park has a compelling interest
to maintain its safe atmosphere by banning patrons in gang-style clothing,
due to the potential for violence such "statement-making" garb carries. The
park's interest in maintaining a safe atmosphere parallels a school's interest
in proscribing expression that would "materially and substantially interfere
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school," as enunciated in Kuhlmeier.
Statistics show that, at "latest count, the gangs of Los Angeles County
alone have grown to 600 with more than 70,000 members."' 78 With an
increase in gang membership comes an increase in potential violence.
Magic Mountain adopted this particular profile to defuse a highly charged
atmosphere, protect its clientele and enhance the family entertainment
environment. These purposes support Magic Mountain's claim that it
should have discretion in "determining what manner of speech is inap-
propriate"'' 79 within the park. On the other hand, plaintiffs may argue
that schools are a special environment in which youths receive fewer
Constitutional protections. Magic Mountain, as an amusement park, does
not fall into this special category. In particular, plaintiffs can cite Bethel
language which states that less exacting standards for the First Amendment
must be implemented in schools because of the "role and purpose of the
American public school system .... ." 8 "Public education must prepare
pupils for citizenship in the Republic .... It must inculcate the habits and
manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as
178. Schillaci, supra note 118.
179. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
180. Id. at 681.
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indispensable to the practice of self-government in the community and the
nation."'
' 8'
Further, the Kuhlmeier holding specifically applied to "educators" and
school sponsored activities. Magic Mountain does not play the same role
as a public school. The park is not responsible for instilling any values in
young people. Quite the contrary, Magic Mountain is an environment
designed for young people to have fun; it is not designed to promote
educational goals. Thus, Magic Mountain will not enjoy the less exacting
standard of scrutiny applied to public school.
Assuming arguendo that Magic Mountain could be characterized as
the equivalent of a school environment, it would be difficult to prove the
park's actions are protected by the First Amendment. Even using the less
rigid standard of Kulhmeier, Magic Mountain could not prove that its
policy of discrimination is a reasonable practice. Its purpose to provide a
safe environment is reasonable, but the means are not. The policy does not
affect all youths. Instead, the policy as applied targets only African
American and Latino youths.
b. Dress as a Protected Form of Expression
Because Magic Mountain denies entry to African American and
Latino youths based on their choice of clothing, the question arises as to
whether dress is a form of expression protected under the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court has held that "[a]ll ideas having even the slightest
redeeming social importance--unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even
ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection
of the guaranties" of the First Amendment. 182 In recent Federal court
decisions, Roth has been interpreted as acknowledging that dress is a form
of expression.
In McIntire v. Bethel School, Independent School District No. 3,183
a federal court held that dress is a protected First Amendment right."8
In Mclntire, students brought a section 1983 civil rights claim against the
school district, school board, and superintendent, alleging violation of the
First Amendment.'85 The students faced suspension from school and/or
being removed from the school basketball team if they wore a T-shirt
which said, "[T]he best of the night's adventures are reserved for those
181. Id.
182. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
183. 804 F. Supp. 1415 (W.D. Okla. 1992).
184. Id. at 1429.
185. Id. at 1418.
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people with nothing planned."'186 The school's administration decided
that the T-shirt would violate the school dress code, as the shirt carried a
slogan associated with an alcoholic beverage.'8 7 The school believed that
the students' wearing of these T-shirts would promote alcohol use and
would substantially disrupt or interfere with class work and the discipline
of the school.'88
The McIntire court determined that the phrase on the T-shirt "is
speech presumptively protected by the First Amendment.' ' 189 The court
additionally found that "[b]ecause the enforcement of the Bethel Public
School Dress Code restricts the exercise of the students' First Amendment
rights, [d]efendants bear the burden of establishing that the T-shirts are
proscribed by the dress code and that the dress code as applied is
constitutional."'' 9' The court held that "[d]efendants failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the message on the T-shirts advertises
an alcoholic beverage. Defendants failed to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that a reasonable student ... would . . . understand the
message as an advertisement for liquor."' 9' The court, therefore, ac-
knowledged that student dress is protected by the First Amendment and
cannot be proscribed unless the school administration can prove that the
dress disrupts the school environment.
In a similar case, another federal court laid out more succinct First
Amendment analysis pertaining to dress. In Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified
School District,192 students challenged the constitutionality of a dress
code which prohibited clothing identifying any professional sports team or
college.' 93 The court determined that "[t]he interest of the state in the
maintenance of its education system is a compelling one and provokes a
balancing of First Amendment rights with the state's efforts to preserve and
protect its educational process."' 194  The court applied the following
analysis:
When a conflict arises between a public school student's right
of free speech and the authority of officials to prescribe and
control conduct in the schools, a student's free speech right may
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Mclntire, 804 F. Supp. at 1420.
189. Id. at 1424.
190. Id. at 1424-25.
191. Id. at 1425.
192. 827 F. Supp. 1459 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
193. Id. at 1460.
194. Id. at 1461.
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not be abridged in the absence of facts which might reasonably
have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of
or material interference with school activities. 95
In the absence of any such justification, the court held that the school may
not discipline a student for exercising First Amendment rights.'9 6 The
court stated that in this case, the school offered "no proof at all of any gang
presence at [the school] or of any actual or threatened disruption or
material interference," and therefore, the school violated the students' First
Amendment rights by proscribing the clothing.197
These cases indicate that dress is a protected form of expression that
schools may only proscribe with just cause. The courts have conceded that
this lesser form of review may not necessarily be appropriate if it is not
applied to a school. "Because of the state's interest in education, the level
of disturbance required to justify intervention is relatively lower in a school
than it might be on a street comer." '98
Magic Mountain's arguments apply with equal force in this instance.
Because of the special environment of Magic Mountain, the park can be
analogized to a school. Magic Mountain is a family entertainment park,
which is responsible for large numbers of patrons at a given time. Patron
safety is potentially jeopardized by young people who choose to display
gang paraphernalia. Gang style clothing can advertise membership in gangs
which can cause material interference with the function of a family
amusement park. As such, Magic Mountain may argue that it should have
the power to proscribe the wearing of gang style clothing within park
boundaries.
Plaintiffs could argue that Magic Mountain violates the First
Amendment right to freedom of expression by denying guests entrance to
the park on the basis of dress. Magic Mountain "uses a set of police
guidelines to identify gang members, including styles and types of clothing,
color of clothing, obvious gang insignia, such as a name written on a T-
shirt or hat."' 99 Magic Mountain has a "practice, pursuant to their policy,
of refusing admission ... to anyone purportedly suspected of being a
'gang' member, and that these suspicions are based ... [on] a profile, or
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1461-62.
197. Jeglin, 827 F. Supp. at 1461-62.
198. Id. at 1461.
199. Kowsky, supra note 4.
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stereotype which relies predominantly upon ... clothing [and] physical
appearance.""2 '
Based on what Magic Mountain and the Los Angeles County Sheriff
assume to be gang style clothing or dress, non-gang members might be
denied entrance into the park. Furthermore, some people who were denied
access to the park "were acting lawfully and in a manner consistent with
proper standards of behavior for attendance at Magic Mountain, and no
different from other patrons permitted full access to Magic Mountain." ''
Therefore, there was no "material interference" with the operation of the
park.
If Magic Mountain is trying to avoid another stabbing incident, the
park instead should focus on finding weapons concealed in any patron's
clothing. Park policy should not single out persons solely because of their
dress. Such a policy runs contrary to the freedom of expression that is
guaranteed in the First Amendment. "Forced dress . . . humiliates the
unwilling complier, forces him [or her] to submerge his [or her] in-
dividuality in the 'undistracting' mass, and in general, smacks of the
exaltation of organization over member, unit over component, and state
over individual.202
V. VIOLATIONS OF THE UNRUH CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
The current language of the Unruh Act reads: "[a]ll persons within
the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their
sex, race, color, religion ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full
and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in
all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. '"2 3 The modem
Unruh Act is based on early common law doctrine, in which merchants
who provided a particular product or service to the community were
charged with the duty to serve all customers in a nondiscriminatory
manner.20 4  In 1897, the California Legislature enacted the statutory
predecessor of the Unruh Act. The 1897 statute provided all citizens with
full and equal access to "all other places of public accommodation or
amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by
200. Alarcon Complaint, supra note 31, at 4.
201. Id.
202. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-15, at 1387, (2d ed. 1988)
(quoting Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 621 (5th Cir. 1972) (Wisdom, J. dissenting)).
203. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982).
204. Id. at Historical Note.
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law and [are] applicable alike to all citizens.""2 5  Since the Unruh Act
was broadened, by a 1959 Amendment, to include "all business establish-
ments of every kind whatsoever," Magic Mountain clearly falls within the
current version of the Act.
20 6
The Unruh Act proscribes any form of arbitrary discrimination. A
business generally open to the public may not arbitrarily exclude a would-
be customer from its premises. According to the California Supreme Court:
"The Unruh Act does not permit a business enterprise to exclude an entire
class of individuals on the basis of a generalized prediction that the class
as a whole is more likely to commit misconduct than some other class of
the public."2 °7 Further, the Unruh Act prohibits arbitrary discrimination
on the basis of group stereotypes:
[A]n individual who has committed no such misconduct cannot
be excluded solely because he [or she] falls within a class of
persons whom the owner believes is more likely to engage in
misconduct than some other group. Whether the exclusionary
policy rests on the alleged undesirable propensities of those of
a particular race, nationality, occupation, political affiliation or
age, in this context the Unruh Act protects individuals from such
arbitrary discrimination.2"8
Certain types of discrimination have been deemed to be "reasonable;"
therefore, they cannot be challenged as arbitrary.209 For example, the
Unruh Act is inapplicable to discrimination between patrons based on the
nature of the business enterprise and of the facilities provided.210
Exclusionary policies may be upheld on the ground that the presence of the
excluded group does not accord with the nature of a business enterprise and
of the facilities provided.2 ' To justify a discriminatory policy, the
business enterprise must show that there is a strong public policy in favor
of the discrimination.212
An example of reasonable discrimination is found in Ross v. Forest
Lawn Memorial Park.213 The plaintiff contracted with the defendant for
205. In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992, (Cal. 1970) (quoting Stats. 1897, ch. 108, pt. 137, § 1).
206. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51, Historical Note (West 1982).
207. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115, 125 (Cal. 1982).
208. Id. at 117.
209. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 662 P.2d 427, 429 (Cal. 1983).
210. Id.
211. Marina Point, 640 P.2d at 127.
212. See Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 707 P.2d 195, 202-03 (Cal. 1985).
213. 203 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1984).
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a private funeral and burial service.214 The deceased, who was the
plaintiff's daughter, had been a "punk rocker." The deceased's friends
were also "punk rockers." Fearing that the "punk rocker" friends would
disrupt the services, the plaintiff requested the defendant not to admit them
at the services. 15
Many punk rockers attended both the funeral services in the
chapel and the grave-site burial services. Neither their ap-
pearance nor comportment was in accord with traditional,
solemn funeral ceremonies. Some were in white face makeup
and black lipstick .... The uninvited guests were drinking and
using cocaine, and were physically and verbally abusive to the
family members and their guests." 6
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant negligently failed to exclude
"punk rockers" from the cemetery grounds during the services.1 7 The
defendant relied on the Unruh Civil Rights Act and countered "that it was
prohibited by law from excluding anyone from the cemetery. 2 18 Thus,
the defendant claimed to have no right or duty to exclude the friends of the
deceased from the cemetery during the funeral.
The court disagreed, and held that "[g]iven the sensitive nature of the
services offered by the cemetery, a policy permitting private funerals by
which those who are not invited may not attend is a reasonable regulation
'rationally related to the services performed."' 2 9  A business may ask
persons who are disrupting the premises to leave. 220  Therefore, the
defendant had a right and a duty to exclude the "punk rockers" from the
services. The exclusion was not arbitrary. Given the circumstances,
excluding "punk rockers" was a reasonable action that did not violate the
Unruh Act.
Under Ross, then, Magic Mountain's policy of "refusing to admit
customers and otherwise subject them to discriminating conduct based upon
such stereotyping, [when it] relies heavily upon an individual's race and/or
national origin, is unlawful and arbitrary" under the Unruh Act.22'
Magic Mountain can argue that the use of its gang profile is
"reasonable." The park may contend that the exclusionary policy should
214. Id. at 470.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 471.
218. Ross, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
219. Id. (citing Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115 (Cal. 1982)).
220. Id.
221. Alarcon Complaint, supra note 31, at 8-9.
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be upheld because the presence of gang members detracts from the
atmosphere of a family entertainment park. Further, the park can argue that
there is a strong public policy to keep the park safe and free from gang
activity.
It is unlikely that Magic Mountain's policy will be considered
"reasonable" by a court. First, courts have held expressly that individuals
cannot be excluded unless they have committed prior misconduct. 2 All
of the plaintiffs were excluded from Magic Mountain though they had
committed no unlawful acts. The park's exclusionary policy focuses on
arbitrary suspicions rather than unlawful activity. Second, few cases have
held that discriminatory treatment was not arbitrary based solely on the
nature of the business establishment.223 Therefore, the attempt to main-
tain a family atmosphere cannot be the sole reason for arbitrary
discrimination. Finally, "public policy exceptions to the Unruh Act are
rare."22' 4 Although there is a strong public policy in favor of keeping the
park safe, Magic Mountain's pattern of arbitrary discrimination is not the
least discriminatory way of ensuring patron safety in the park. In Los
Angeles, gang clothing has gained great popularity among all youths. 5
Consequently, gang attire may not be a true indicator of potential violence
or of gang members. If the park's true purpose is to maintain a family
environment, then more neutral precautions should be implemented. For
example, Magic Mountain could install metal detectors, park security could
search all guests seeking entrance or, more simply, Magic Mountain could
post a sign indicating what clothes cannot be worn inside the park.
222. See Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115, 125 (Cal. 1982).
223. Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 707 P.2d 195, 198 (Cal. 1985).
224. Id. at 198, n.8.
225. Many Los Angeles area schools are having to ban gang style clothing because "the
styles that youth are drawn to are associated with gangs." Diane Seo, Urban Fashion's Big
Attraction, L.A. TiMES, Nov. 21, 1993, at City Times 16.
In contrast to Magic Mountain's approach, Great America Park in Santa Clara has
implemented a more sensitive policy. It states that "[c]ertain styles, colors, and insignia once
common only to gang members have become fashion trends. The consequence is that some in-
nocent people have been mistaken for gang affiliates and have been denied admission to Great
America." Letter from Lise Shannon, Public Relation Manager, Great America Corporation,
Santa Clara, Cal. (on file with author).
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A. Discriminatory Denial of Access to Public
Accommodations Based on Ancestry
The Unruh Act expressly prohibits discriminatory treatment on the
basis of national origin. The California Court of Appeal held in
Winchell v. English..7 that "[s]tatutes such as the [Unruh Act] are
declaratory of the state's public policy against racial discrimination whether
it be private action, or public action .... ""' "Discrimination on the
basis of race or color is contrary to the public policy of the United States
and of this state. -29  In Suttles v. Hollywood Turf Club,23 ° the court
found a violation of the predecessor to the Unruh Act when a clubhouse at
a racetrack refused to allow African Americans to enter. The plaintiffs had
purchased tickets for admission into the club and had reservations for box
seats. The defendant refused the plaintiffs entry to the clubhouse because
of their color.23 ' The court held that the defendant's actions violated the
Unruh Act by failing to grant "full and equal accommodations, advantages,
facilities and privileges of ... places of public accommodation or
amusement ....232
Admission policies which discriminate on the basis of race violate the
Unruh Act.2 33 The use of the policy has primarily affected only African
American and Latino youths. Magic Mountain therefore:
unlawfully discriminate[s] against [persons] by ordering them
out of the public entrance line, searching them, detaining them,
and then denying them admission. [Persons], due to their
national origin, [are] thereby denied their rights to full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities and accommodations
offered to the public-at-large by [Magic Mountain]. 34
In the cases brought against Magic Mountain by the African American
and Latino plaintiffs, there was no evidence to indicate that the individuals
who were subjected to the park's search were engaging in unlawful
conduct.235 Although Magic Mountain claims that the policy itself is
226. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982).
227. 133 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1976).
228. Id. at 21 (citing James v. Marinship Corp., 155 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1944)).
229. Id. (quoting Burks v. Poppy Const. Co., 370 P.2d 313, 317 (Cal. 1962)).
230. 114 P.2d 27 (Cal. 1941).
231. Id. at 28.
232. Id. at 29.
233. Winchell, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 21-22.
234. Alarcon Complaint, supra note 31, at 8.
235. Alarcon Complaint, supra note 31; Hernandez Complaint, supra note 9.
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race-neutral, park employees apply the policy in a facially discriminatory
manner.
B. Discriminatory Denial of Access to Public
Accommodations Based on Clothing
The Unruh Act prohibits particular kinds of discrimination, setting out
categories which serve "as illustrative, rather than restrictive, indicia of the
type of conduct condemned." '236 California courts have extended the
Unruh Act to protect those who are discriminated against on the basis of
physical characteristics and clothing.
In In re Cox,237 the California Supreme Court held that before one
who "wore long hair and unconventional dress" could be prohibited from
patronizing a shopping mall, there must be a showing of cause. In Cox, the
petitioner had been charged with violating a municipal trespass or-
dinance.238 A mall security guard asked the petitioner to leave the
premises because he wore long hair and unconventional dress.239 When
the petitioner refused, he was arrested by the police. 240  The petitioner
defended against the prosecution for his violation of a municipal trespass
ordinance, claiming that he could not be excluded arbitrarily from the mall
on the basis of dress.21  The Court stated in dicta that the Unruh Act
does not permit the shopping mall to "arbitrarily exclude a would-be
customer from its premises .... 242
Similarly, in Hales v. Ojai Valley Inn and Country Club,243 the
plaintiff and his family entered the defendant's place of business to
purchase food and drink. Plaintiff was wearing a "leisure suit.
'
"244
Defendant denied plaintiff entrance into the establishment stating that
plaintiff could only be served if he wore a tie.24' However, women
wearing similar leisure suits were being served. 246 The court held that a
claim for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act was adequately stated by
236. In re Cox, 474 P.2d 992, 995 (Cal. 1970).
237. In re Cox, 474 P. 2d 992 (Cal. 1970).
238. Id. at 994-95.
239. Id. at 994.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 993.
242. Id. at 999 (upholding the mall's exclusion of the petitioner on other grounds).
243. 140 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1977).
244. Id. at 557.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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allegations that male plaintiffs were denied service in defendant's public
establishment solely because they were without a tie or coat.
On point with the Magic Mountain cases is the depublished opinion,
Renteria v. Dirty Dan ', Inc. 247 As a depublished opinion, Renteria
carries no precedential weight in California. Its issues, however, mirror
those addressed in this Article. In Renteria, the court decided that the
Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibited bar owners from denying service to
individuals who wore motorcycle gang clothing and insignia. The court
held that "[t]he Unruh Act does not permit a business enterprise to exclude
an entire class of individuals on the basis of a generalized prediction that
the class 'as a whole' is more likely to commit misconduct than some other
class .... ," The plaintiff, Renteria, was denied entrance to bars owned
by defendant because he wore motorcycle gang "colors" and patches. The
defendant defended the unwritten dress code by stating:
It is certainly a fact of common knowledge and beyond dispute
that there are a number of motorcycle gangs operating within the
County of San Diego which view themselves in competition
with or as hostile toward one another .... [B]ased upon our
knowledge gained from experience that competing or hostile
motorcycle gang members often engage in violent confrontation
with one another, we have included in our dress code re-
quirements a prohibition as to the wearing of motorcycle gang
insignia.249
The court found that Renteria was denied admission to and service at
the bars "[b]ecause he wore motorcycle club insignia."25  Yet, as the
court noted, defendants failed to cite to a single confrontation in their bar
which involved those who wore the insignia.25 ' The court held that the
Unruh Civil Rights Act protects every individual against arbitrary
discrimination. As such, bars and restaurants are proscribed from
arbitrarily discriminating against individual patrons.252  Further, the
"exclusion based on insignia cannot be justified as an attempt to maintain
a certain ambiance [sic] by setting dress standards., 253 The court held
247. 244 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1988). This case was denied review by the California Supreme
Court, which ordered that the opinion not be officially published.
248. Id. at 424-25 (emphasis in original) (quoting Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d
115, 125 (Cal. 1982)).
249. Id. at 426.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 427.
252. Renteria, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
253. Id. at 427.
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that the defendants' exclusionary policy was, in fact, arbitrary because
Renteria could have been wearing a tuxedo and would still be excluded if
his cummerbund contained motorcycle club insignia."
The court also stated that the test for arbitrary discrimination is not
whether an exclusionary policy is "rational" but whether it is based on a
stereotype.255 "Exclusion of Renteria cannot be excused or justified on
the basis of a rational good faith belief that persons wearing insignia
denoting membership in motorcycle clubs may be "troublemakers." The
Unruh Act was specifically designed to prohibit exactly such
stereotyping. 256
This holding, though depublished, follows the tradition of granting
owners broad authority to adopt reasonable rules that regulate their patrons'
or tenants' conduct. An owner still has the right to exclude any individual
who violates such rules.257 However, under the Unruh Act, "an in-
dividual who has committed no such misconduct cannot be excluded solely
because he falls within a class of persons whom the owner believes is more
likely to engage in misconduct than some other group. '258 Renteria "was
not excluded from bars for misconduct .... There are no facts here which
compel the conclusion he does not comport himself consistent with
manners appropriate to a topless bar environment, whether wearing
motorcycle club insignia or not. 
259
Two cases mirror the Renteria analysis regarding the exclusion of
parties from business establishments when there is no showing of
misconduct. In Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club,26° the California
Supreme Court held that an individual could not be excluded from a
racetrack on the basis of character. The Los Angeles Turf Club sought to
exclude Orloff from the racetrack because he was a bookmaker. He was
thus considered a member of a class of persons with a reputation of
"immoral character." 261 The defendant claimed that the bookmaker's
class was more likely than the general population to engage in illegal
activities which a public race track legitimately could seek to prevent.262
However, the court held the classification to be arbitrary, because an
254. Id.
255. Id. at 427-28.
256. Id.
257. Renteria, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
258. Id. (quoting Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115, 117 (Cal. 1982)).
259. Id.
260. 227 P.2d 449, 451 (Cal. 1951).
261. Id.
262. Id.
1996]
394 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16
individual must be judged on the basis of his own conduct-not on a
reputation for immoral behavior.2 63  The court noted that judicial
interpretations of the Unruh Act's predecessor "barred the manager of a
race track from expelling a patron who had acquired a reputation as a man
of immoral character."" 6  The court further stated that to deny entry is
a "restraint on a personal right, [and] is circumscribed by the same
constitutional safeguards of equal protection and due process as are
restraints under penal laws. 265
In Stoumen v. Reilly,26 6 the defendant excluded homosexuals from
his restaurant bar because homosexuals as a class were more likely to
engage in "immoral conduct" than heterosexuals. The court held that this
class generalization did not constitute a proper basis for an exclusion of all
homosexuals. 267 The court held that "[m]embers of the public ... have
a right to patronize a public restaurant and bar so long as they are acting
properly and are not committing illegal or immoral acts; the proprietor has
no right to exclude or eject a patron 'except for good cause. ,'268 The
court said that simply because homosexuals frequent a restaurant, it does
not imply the "doing of illegal or immoral acts on the premises, which
would warrant exclusion." '269
Because Magic Mountain has multiple violent incidents, including
stabbings, the park could argue that it is reasonable to regulate guest attire.
It is common knowledge that gang insignia on clothing has provoked
violent incidents. Magic Mountain can argue that since violence erupted
at the park because of gang members, (1) the prohibition of gang attire is
rationally related to its purpose of keeping the park free from gang
violence, and (2) the policy of excluding guests who fit into the gang
profile is not an arbitrary regulation.
Plaintiffs may counter that the test for arbitrary discrimination is not
determined by whether the exclusion was rational. The proper test
considers whether the exclusion is based on group stereotypes.
270
263. Id. at 452.
264. Id.
265. Orloff, 227 P.2d at 453.
266. 234 P.2d 969 (Cal. 1951).
267. Id. at 971.
268. Id.
269. Id. The court contrasted the restaurant in Stoumen with establishments reputed to be
used as houses of prostitution, where it is fair to imply that "illegal or immoral acts" occur.
270. See generally Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 227 P.2d 449, 452 (Cal. 1951);
Stoumen, 234 P.2d at 971,
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Plaintiffs may argue that Magic Mountain is stereotyping those groups
wearing gang style clothing.
The park's argument is strengthened because gang clothing has
become a strong trend among teenagers. Plaintiffs can argue that gang-
wear has become such a prevalent fashion that Magic Mountain goes
beyond simply assuming that all gang members will cause trouble. By
using its profile, the park assumes that all who fit the profile are gang
members. Although Renteria is depublished, and therefore has no
precedential value, the plaintiffs can use arguments similar to those offered
in Renteria: that the exclusion of gang insignia or clothing cannot be
justified as an attempt to maintain a certain ambiance by setting dress
standards.
The plaintiffs' strongest argument rests on the Unruh Act's protection
of individuals. The Act states that when an individual does not violate
rules of conduct, he or she may not be excluded from an establishment.
The courts held in Orloff and Stoumen that one who commits no miscon-
duct cannot be excluded solely because he or she falls within a class of
persons which the owner believes is more likely to engage in misconduct
than other classes. At the time they were searched, none of the plaintiffs
had engaged in any misconduct. Therefore, their exclusion resulted from
being part of a class of persons that the owner believed would cause
trouble. Under the Unruh Act, such action is arbitrary regulation based on
stereotyping.
C. Discriminatory Denial of Access to Public
Accommodation Based on Age
The Unruh Act protects minors, as well as adults, from arbitrary
discrimination. In Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson,27' a landlord refused to
renew defendant's lease because the landlord learned that the defendant had
a child.272 The landlord had implemented a "no-children" policy in an
attempt to exclude children from his apartment complex.2 73 He argued
that since children were generally "rowdier, noisier, more mischievous and
more boisterous than adults," the policy excluding all minors was
reasonably related to the policy interest of preserving a serene environment
for his tenants.274 The California Supreme Court determined that the
271. 640 P.2d 115 (Cal. 1982).
272. Id. at 116.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 117.
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policy contradicted a societal interest.2 75  The landlord's argument
"overlook[ed] the individual nature of the statutory right to equal access to
business establishments ... afforded [to] 'all persons' by the Unruh
Act. '276 The court went further, ruling that "[a] society that sanctions
wholesale discrimination against its children ... engages in suspect
activity. Even the most primitive society fosters the protection of its
young.... Indeed, under the Unruh Act we have condemned any arbitrary
discrimination against any class.,
277
The California court also has held that when fast food outlets and
convenience stores treated students differently than other patrons, the
merchants violated the Unruh Act.278 Discriminatory practices, including
limiting the number of student patrons, restricting students to certain hours
or portions of the premises, or levying a minimum charge on student
purchases were determined to be arbitrary and unlawful. 79
Magic Mountain's position would be that its policy does not classify
on the basis of age. Further, unlike Marina Point, the park does not
exclude all teenagers. It only excludes those who happen to fit the
characteristics of the gang profile. Magic Mountain will assert that it is a
"family entertainment park," and that a large portion of those admitted are
teenagers. 8° Magic Mountain also can argue that the gang profile, while
it denies entrance to some teenagers, is necessary to maintain a safe
environment. Therefore, the gang profile does not discriminate arbitrarily
against teenagers.
However, Magic Mountain primarily excludes teenagers. 28 ' Those
to whom the park denied entrance were all between the ages of 14 and
16182 This blanket discrimination against teenagers can be said to violate
the Unruh Act. While the profile ignores teenagers as individuals, it
classifies them according to dress. As a "family entertainment park,,
283
Magic Mountain's policies should be compatible with the styles of its
teenaged guests-particularly when those teens are accompanied by adults.
275. Id. at 129.
276. Marina Point, 640 P.2d at 117.
277. Id. at 129.
278. Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 707 P.2d 195, 197 (Cal. 1985) (discussing 59 Ops. Cal. Atty.
Gen. 70 (1976)).
279. Id.
280. Padilla, supra note 1.
281. See Sobel, supra note 10.
282. Id.
283. Schillaci, supra note 118.
SIX FLAGS MAGIC MOUNTAIN
Yet, the park's practice is incompatible with its own business goals. It
discriminates against the very people to whom the park seeks to appeal.
Magic Mountain's policy of excluding youths on the basis of dress,
subjecting them to rules unrelated to guest conduct if they wish to enter the
park, fails under the case law prohibiting discriminatory practices against
teenagers. Magic Mountain has created an arbitrary class which affects
teenagers.
VI. CONCLUSION
Magic Mountain implemented its gang screening policy to protect the
family entertainment amusement park from gang violence.2" The policy,
as applied, allows the park to exclude African American and Latino youths
based on their clothing.285 However, gang style clothing has become
increasingly popular among California youths. As such, the park policy
violates the rights of teens. The park denies entrance on the basis of dress
and race: guests who wear "gang" clothing are excluded only when the
wearers are also members of suspect racial classes.
Magic Mountain, as a private corporation, is not subject to suit based
on federal constitutional claims. However, this Article contends that the
park's private party status is debatable. The Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department has been integral in forming and implementing the screening
policy.28 6  Magic Mountain is so interrelated with the Los Angeles
County Sheriff's Department in executing its policy that the park should be
considered a state actor. The park is also arguably acting pursuant to state
regulations: the policy was created by the Sheriff's Department and the
park sometimes uses sheriffs to assist park security in removing guests
pursuant to the policy.
Once considered a state actor, Magic Mountain arguably violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The screening
policy is applied so as only to affect youths of African American and
Latino descent. Yet, since all races wear the trendy gang clothing, the park
actually discriminates on the basis of skin color, not clothing.
Magic Mountain also may be seen as a joint state actor which violates
the First Amendment rights of youths who wish to wear gang dress. As
long as the youths are not engaged in any unlawful action and are not in
possession of any weapons upon entering the park, the youths should not
284. Padilla, supra note 1.
285. See supra part IV.B.2.
286. Schillaci, supra note 118.
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be excluded. Gang members are not the only people who wear "gang"
clothing.
Plaintiffs have an alternative argument: Magic Mountain may be
subject to liability for violating the California Unruh Act. The park
arbitrarily excludes youths on the basis of dress, and has no reasonable
justification to use dress as the premise for exclusion.
Finally, this Article proposes that Magic Mountain has a valid claim
to protect the park. The issue, however, is not the park's need to be
protected, but the means by which its management protects it. The park
could achieve its safety goals with less discriminatory means. The
screening policy as applied does not further its purpose. Anyone can carry
a weapon into the park-not just gang members or those dressed like gang
members. Magic Mountain's arbitrary policy allows guests who do not
dress in gang style garb, but who do carry weapons, to evade the screening
and enter the park. To protect the park, all guests should be subject to the
same searches.
